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RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN PHILADELPHIA
Philip Hamburger
Some controversies seem particularly significant for the development of
constitutional rights. For the freedom from an establishment of religion, the
most famous early debate occurred in Virginia in the mid-1780s. 1 For the
more immediate freedom of religion, however-the freedom from penalty or
constraint on religion-the central historical debate is less familiar. It was in
some respects merely a local quarrel, which embroiled Quakers and
Revolutionaries in Philadelphia during a few tense weeks in 1775.
Nonetheless, it was a revealing moment in the development of American
religious liberty. At a time when Americans were struggling for equality
against Britain, they also expected equality in their religious liberty, and their
egalitarian vision of their freedom from penalties on religion soon came into
conflict with the perspective of those who needed a greater religious liberty.
Of course, this tension between different conceptions of religious liberty was
evident in many states, but nowhere were the results more dramatic than in
Philadelphia, and today, the controversy in Philadelphia reveals much about
the character of American religious liberty and about its foundations in
American society and its ideals.
The Philadelphia controversy illuminates the historical background of the
freedom from penalty on religion in the same way that the debate in Virginia
sheds light on the freedom from an establishment. Although the Virginia
controversy was only one of many state controversies over an establishment, it
was the most extensive and salient such dispute, and therefore when the
* Maurice and Hilda Friedman Professor, Columbia Law School. J.D., Yale University (1982); B.A.,
Princeton University (1979). 1 am grateful to the University of Connecticut Law School faculty workshop and
to Eric Claeys, Ira Lupu, Liam O'Melinn, Gregg Roeber, Adam Samaha, Winnifred Sullivan, and Hermann
Wellenreuther for their learned and thoughtful comments on this Article. I am also obliged to the Rhode
Island Historical Society and the Valentine Museum for the opportunity to quote manuscripts in their
possession.
1 For the best account of the Virginia debate, see THOMAS E. BUCKLEY, CHURCH AND STATE IN
REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA, 1776-1787 (1977). Incidentally, it is customary to assume that James Madison
introduced into the First Amendment the antiestablishment position he earlier developed in Virginia. The
evidence, however, reveals that the First Amendment stated a position similar to that which Madison had
attributed to his religious allies in Virginia. PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 101-07
(2002); see, e.g., infra note 8.
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Supreme Court and modem commentators examine the federal or state
establishment clauses, they regularly hark back to the events in Virginia. 2 It is
another matter, however, when they discuss the First Amendment's free
exercise clause-let alone the state guarantees of freedom from penalty on
religion. Particularly when judges and commentators consider whether the
freedom from penalty includes a right of religious exemption from general
laws, they tend to write as if there was no public debate on which they can
rely. To be sure, much is known about the struggle against laws that penalized
minority religions, but there has not seemed to be any public dispute equivalent
to the Virginia establishment debate on whether the freedom from penalty
extended to a freedom from general laws. Hence, the significance of the
controversy in Philadelphia. It was the most prominent late eighteenth-century
debate on a general constitutional right of religious exemption, and although it
has been elegantly explored by the church historian Richard K. MacMaster,
and although his hints about its constitutional significance have been echoed
by Ellis West, the debate in Philadelphia has not received adequate attention
for the ways it can fill in some of the missing historical background behind the
Free Exercise Clause and other constitutional guarantees of the freedom from
penalty.3
Conceptually, the Philadelphia debate illustrates a turning point, for it
reveals how two concepts of religious liberty-a freedom under law,
regardless of one's religion and a freedom from law on account of one's
religion-came to be sharply differentiated in popular politics. Religious
dissenters in England had long sought a freedom from the penalties imposed
2 For the importance of distinguishing among the different antiestablishment arguments in Virginia, see
PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 89-107 (2002). For the value of looking at
antiestablishment arguments beyond Virginia, see Philip Hamburger, Equality and Diversity: The Eighteenth-
Century Debate About Equal Protection and Equal Civil Rights, 1992 Sup. CT. REV. 295, 313-67.
3 Richard K. MacMaster, Neither Whig Nor Tory: The Peace Churches in the American Revolution, 9
FIDES ET HISTORIA 8, 12 (1977) [hereinafter MacMaster, Neither Whig Nor Tory]. MacMaster concludes that
"[tihe real significance of the wartime experience of the historic peace churches is theological." Id. at 20.
Although this Article has a different focus, it is much indebted to MacMaster's work. For the classic account
of the Quakers during the Revolution, see generally ARTHUR J. MEKEEL, THE QUAKERS AND THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (1996).
The Philadelphia debate has been noted in the literature on a constitutional right of exemption by the
author of this Article and later in greater depth by Ellis West. Philip Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of
Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915, 930 n.65 (1992) [hereinafter
Hamburger, A Constitutional Right]; Ellis M. West, The Right to Religion-Based Exemptions in Early
America: The Case of the Conscientious Objectors to Conscription, 10 J.L. & RELIGION 367, 389-93 (1993-
94). These studies, however, simply rely on MacMaster and do not explore the breadth of the debate's
implications for religious liberty.
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on account of their religion, and most of them therefore desired an equal
freedom under general, nondiscriminatory laws. Some dissenters, however,
most prominently the Quakers, traditionally sought a more expansive
freedom-a freedom from general laws precisely on account of their religious
objections to them. While English laws continued to single out religious
differences as a basis for penalizing individuals, Quakers and other dissenters
could join in common cause against such laws, regardless of the sort of
religious liberty they ultimately needed, and therefore a sharp distinction
between their different conceptions of religious liberty did not ordinarily rise to
the surface of popular politics. Even when Quakers sometimes sought a
separate peace with the English government, they did not disturb the sense that
all Protestant dissenters had a common complaint against unequal laws. For
example, the English religious dissenter Philip Furneaux in 1770 prominently
argued that laws should impose penalties on individuals "without any regard to
their religious principles," but he felt no need to distance himself from the
Quakers or others who might need a freedom from law on account of their
religion.4 In America, however, expectations of equality increasingly came
into conflict with Quaker aspirations, and when Americans in 1775 created a
regime based on ideals of equal freedom, it was inevitable that there would be
a parting of the ways between those who expected equal freedom under law,
regardless of their religion, and those who still needed a freedom from law on
account of their religion.5 The Revolution thus was the catalyst in which these
conceptions of religious liberty became more completely differentiated and in
6
which a majority emphatically chose one over the other.
4 Philip Furneaux, Letters to the Honourable Mr. Justice Blackstone, Concerning His Exposition of the
Act of Toleration 61 (London, T. Cadell 1770).
5 Similarly, Quakers dropped out of the campaign against establishments. I WILLIAM G. McLoUGHLIN,
NEw ENGLAND DISSENT, 1630-1883: THE BAPTISTS AND THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE, at 595,607
n.33 (1971).
Incidentally, MacMaster observes that "[w]ar brought the essential conflict between the sects and the
state into sharper focus, because in wartime the state necessarily makes far greater demands on the individual
than in time of peace." MacMaster, Neither Whig Nor Tory, supra note 3, at 21. The War undoubtedly
exacerbated the conflict between the pacifist sects and the government, but the sharpened differentiation
between the two concepts of religious liberty followed more directly from the establishment of a religiously
diverse regime that idealized equal liberty. Earlier, for example, the French and Indian War created much
tension between Quakers and their fellow Pennsylvanians without leading to as sharp a differentiation among
ideals of religious liberty as occurred during the Revolution, and after the Peace Treaty of 1783, Quakers were
as anxious about the threat to their vision of religious liberty during peacetime as during war-the most
prominent illustration being the 1791 controversy over the militia bill.
6 Methodologically, the events in Philadelphia thus serve as a reminder of how much can be learned
from a diversity of opinion among early Americans. Eighteenth-century Americans tended to disagree about
the proper scope of their freedom, and it has been suggested that this precludes attempts to decipher their
20051
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The debate in Philadelphia additionally reveals the role of context in
limiting conceptual options. Religious liberty was typically understood as a
freedom from government oppression. Different conceptions of this freedom,
however, can seem more or less appealing in different circumstances, and
American ideas about the freedom from penalties on religion developed along
somewhat different lines than English ideas. The hierarchy and inequality of
England was such that dissenters could find common cause against the unequal
constraints of English law, and therefore neither Quakers nor other dissenters
had much occasion in the eighteenth century to draw attention to their
differences about religious liberty. In contrast, the diversity of Americans and
their expectations of equal rights sharpened their differences about religious
liberty and left little doubt which ideal would prevail. In Pennsylvania,
Quakers became painfully isolated in their attachment to a religious freedom
from law, and a diverse majority acquired an uncompromising sense of
confidence in its ideals of equal religious liberty. Diverse religious groups
united in a struggle for equal liberty against foreign and domestic oppression,
and when Quakers complained that equal liberty was not enough-when they
demanded a general freedom from the laws they considered contrary to
conscience-the Revolutionaries responded with little patience. The
Pennsylvania Revolutionaries were tolerant enough to guarantee a
constitutional exemption from military service, but they were sufficiently
attached to equality under law to demand an equivalent from those who were
exempted and to deny that there was a general constitutional religious liberty
constitutional guarantees. In particular, the absence of a "common understanding" of the freedom from an
establishment or the freedom from penalty is said to be an obstacle to ascertaining what the First Amendment
meant when it guaranteed these rights. McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005). Early
Americans, however, recognized that they disagreed about religious liberty, and those who had the power to
shape the drafting of their constitutions therefore took care to specify the sort of religious liberty they desired.
Precisely because early Americans struggled over different conceptions of their liberty and carried this
struggle into their drafting of constitutions, it is possible observe where their constitutions stood within the
range of different opinions.
For these purposes, it is necessary to understand the fractures among and within religious societies and
to resist the homogenization of religious societies and beliefs that is commonplace in the literature on religious
liberty. For example, MacMaster and many others tend to lump different religious societies together under the
rubric of "peace churches," and although MacMaster acknowledges that Moravians and Schwenkfelders
consented to pay an equivalent for military service, he suggests on limited evidence that "Quakers and
Mennonites generally took" a "stand" against payment as much as against military service. MacMaster,
Neither Whig Nor Tory, supra note 3, at 19. Yet this obscures some essential tensions. In particular, it clouds
the differences between the Mennonites and the Quakers in 1775, and it thus fails to recognize the degree to
which the controversy in 1775 was at least as much about paying as about fighting. Moreover, it glosses over
the divisions within religious societies-divisions that as will be seen can shed light on the broader disputes.
Indeed, not only religious societies, but even individuals could be of two minds-as when men spoke in
general terms against an equivalent but were content to pay it.
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from nondiscriminatory laws. Amid the diversity of the New World, popular
tolerance thus moderated popular demands for equal rights, but expectations of
equal rights precluded any general religious freedom from law.
In drawing constitutional conclusions, some caveats are necessary. A
single controversy in Philadelphia is not by itself evidence of the model of
religious liberty adopted elsewhere, and the Philadelphia evidence therefore
needs to be evaluated against the background of what was happening in other
parts of the country. As it happens, the evidence from other states suggests
that the Philadelphia debate illustrates more general tendencies, but certainly
.7
the events in Philadelphia were distinctively dramatic. More broadly, every
model of religious liberty has many possible variants, and therefore the
prevalence of the model based on equal freedom under law should not obscure
the details of the specific guarantees of religious liberty in each American
constitution, whether state or federal. Indeed, attention to the specific
guarantees in each constitution is particularly important because the more
general a model of religious liberty, the more easily it can be taken to
dangerous extremes. Accordingly, even while observing how Americans
pursued the ideal of equal freedom under law, it is essential to note that
American constitutions moderated the rigor of this model by specifying
exemptions or at least leaving space for them.8 These caveats having been
stated, it is possible to reach the constitutional points: that the particular
constitutional guarantees of the freedom from penalty were variations on a
broader concept of this religious liberty-a notion of equal freedom under law,
regardless of one's religion-and that the choice of this concept of religious
liberty over the alternative desired by the Quakers has deep foundations in
American society and its ideals of equal rights.
7 For more on the late eighteenth-century American rejection of a general constitutional right of
religious exemption, see generally Hamburger, A Constitutional Right, supra note 3, and Philip Hamburger,
More Is Less, 90 VA. L. REV. 835 (2004) [hereinafter Hamburger, More Is Less].
8 Thus, in the U.S. Bill of Rights, the free exercise clause merely prohibits any penalty on religion, but
the establishment clause permits at least some legislative exemptions. Although some Americans (including
James Madison) had hoped for a constitutional guarantee against any law respecting, touching, or taking
cognizance of religion, the First Amendment stated that Congress shall make "no law respecting an
establishment of religion," thus allowing laws respecting religion and even (as in the case of exemption
statutes) favoring it, as long as they did not go so far as to respect an establishment of religion.
20051
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I. THE BEGINNING OF THE DIsPUTE: EXEMPTION AND EQUIVALENT
As the contest between Britain and America began in earnest during 1775,
Quakers and Revolutionaries in Philadelphia increasingly found themselves in
disagreement. They took divergent views of an exemption from military
service and the payment of an equivalent by those who were excused from
fighting, and in the course of debating these issues, they enunciated sharply
different conceptions of religious liberty.
Already two decades before the Revolution, Quakers had resolved to
withdraw from politics and rely upon the goodwill of the British. After their
arrival in the seventeenth century, Quakers had dominated Pennsylvania
politics, and in so doing, they had often betrayed a worldliness not made more
attractive by their professions of piety. The hypocrisy in which Quakers might
be ensnared by political power became especially apparent, not least to
themselves, in their disastrous handling of the beginnings of the French and
Indian War in 1754. By conducting a war to defend the frontier, Quaker
leaders drew upon themselves the reproach that they were violating their own
assertions of conscience; by failing to conduct the war with the necessary
vigor, and by refusing to impose war taxes upon Friends, Quaker leaders
prompted more secular complaints. The Quakers understood as well as anyone
the costs for both piety and policy, and they therefore reconsidered whether
they could maintain their principles while acting in positions of worldly power.
Changing demographics were in any case making Quaker control of the colony
increasingly tenuous. Dedicated to their principles, they decided at their 1754
yearly meeting to withdraw from political activity.9 Of course, this is hardly to
9 RICHARD BAUMAN, FOR THE REPUTATION OF TRUTH: POLITICS, RELIGION, AND CONFLICT AMONG THE
PENNSYLVANIA QUAKERS, 1750-1800, at 54-55, 70-71 (1971); JACK D. MARIETTA, THE REFORMATION OF
AMERICAN QUAKERISM, 1748-1783, at 80-81, 121-22 (1984). In the words of one of the Quakers' apologists:
For a considerable number of years many of them were concerned with others in the legislative
and executive part of civil government, wherein they manifested a firm attachment to the
constitutional rights of the people; but as acting in these stations was attended with snares and
temptations, it was the concern of their yearly-meeting to excite such to a watchful care against
deviating from their christian, peaceable principles; and at length as the inhabitants became
numerous, by emigrations from Europe and otherwise, and the holding public offices was
attended with greater difficulty, services being required which interfered more immediately with
their religious principles, the yearly meeting advised their members to withdraw therefrom,
perceiving that the seeking or accepting of offices in legislation or magistracy was dangerous,
and frequently injurious to the individuals in a religious sense; more especially when fought for
and accepted for the sake of the profits, emoluments and worldly honours annexed to them,
tending to debase the mind to the odious bondage of ambition and avarice.
[Vol. 54
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suggest that they all conformed immediately to this proscription or that they
did not retain substantial influence through their wealth and their reputation for
piety and industriousness. On the whole, however, they withdrew from the
worldliness of politics, and instead of pursuing power, they cultivated good
relations with the English and sought to secure for themselves the position they
enjoyed in England-that of a specially protected minority.
A special relationship with the British, however, was of little comfort to the
Quakers in the 1770s. Indeed, the Quakers' relations with the British were
among the reasons they were distrusted. Quite apart from those Quakers who
actively cooperated with the British, many continued to acquiesce in colonial
rule-their justification being that they had a religious obligation to submit
with Christian patience to the civil authority.
Revolutionaries particularly resented that most Quakers refused to join or
otherwise support Pennsylvania's voluntary "association" or militia. It was
bad enough that the Quakers would not participate in the association, but it
therefore seemed all the more outrageous that they also declined to pay an
equivalent. Although the Quaker nonassociators typically did not directly
support Britain, their failure to associate or give money provoked deep
suspicions among associators-suspicions hardly allayed by the knowledge
that some Quakers were fighting for the Crown. Even the many Quakers
whose protestations of neutrality seemed sincere appeared to the
Revolutionaries to be reaping all the benefits of protection without making any
of the physical or monetary sacrifices endured by their fellow citizens. The
unwillingness of the Quakers to contribute to the American cause seemed all
the more outrageous because of their wealth. Amid the passions of revolution
and war, Quakers, Mennonites, and other pacifists found themselves at the
mercy of resentful mobs of associators, who occasionally educated their fellow
Americans as to the cost of ignoring their civic duties. Opposed to this sort of
brutality, the Pennsylvania Assembly in June 1776 reminded the associators
that "many of the good People of this Province are conscientiously scrupulous
of bearing Arms" and "recommend[ed] to the Associators for the Defense of
their Country, and others, that they bear a tenderly and brotherly Regard
toward this Class of their Fellow-Subjects and Country-Men."10
ANTHONY BENEZET, A SHORT ACCOUNT OF THE PEOPLE CALLED QUAKERS 25-26 (New Bedford, Abraham
Shearman 1799).
10 6 VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PROVINCE OF PENNSYLVANIA
594 (Philadelphia, Henry Miller 1776) [hereinafter PA. HOUSE JOURNAL], also quoted in Wilbur J. Bender,
Pacifism Among the Mennonites, Amish Mennonites and Schwenkfelders of Pennsylvania to 1783, pt. II, 1
2005]
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In this tense situation, in which associators were increasingly resentful of
Quakers, the Continental Congress proposed a compromise. Congress sought
to ensure that the Quakers and others made contributions of some sort for their
failure to serve, but it was content to allow them the illusion that such
contributions were not really in support of the war. Congress proposed this
compromise in July 1775 when it recommended to "the inhabitants of all the
united English Colonies in North-America, that all able bodied effective men,
between sixteen and fifty years of age immediately form themselves into
regular companies of Militia." 11 At the same time, Congress proposed that
conscientious objectors be exempt from such duties, but rather than ask that
objectors be required to pay an "equivalent" for military service, it suggested
that they make "liberal contributions" to those who were in need as a result of
the war:
As there are some people, who, from religious principles, cannot bear
arms in any case, this Congress intend no violence to their
consciences, but earnestly recommend it to them, to contribute
liberally in this time of universal calamity, to the relief of their
distressed brethren in the several colonies, and to do all other
services to their oppressed Country, which they can consistently with
their religious principles.12
This was understood to be "protection money."'13  Nonetheless, if Quakers
could contribute for what were euphemistically called "distressed brethren,"
they and the Revolutionaries could find common ground somewhere between
their different principles. 14
MENNONITE Q. REV. 21, 23 (1927).
11 Resolutions (July 18, 1775), in 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 187-88 (1905).
12 Id. at 189. For this proposal and its acceptability to Quakers and Mennonites, see MacMaster, Neither
Whig Nor Tory, supra note 3, at 12. See also Minutes of the Committee of Safety, July 28, 1775, in 10
COLONIAL REcORDS 293 (Harrisburg, 1852), quoted in Bender, supra note 10, at 23.
13 Letter from Joseph Stoll (1775), in MacMaster, Neither Whig Nor Tory, supra note 3, at 14.
14 As MacMaster puts it, "[t]he peace churches understood their contributions as charitable donations to
the poor, although they were aware of ambiguities in their position." MacMaster, Neither Whig Nor Tory,
supra note 3, at 14. He quotes a letter from Jacob Stoll of the Church of the Brethren congregation at
Conestoga in Lancaster County:
I have received your dear letter to me and learned from it that a demand has been made upon
you to give money and I further learned from it that you would like to know how we have given
our money, [whether] for "protection money" o[r] "for the needy." Let this serve as an answer
that in part it has been given for both. There seemed to be no other alternative than to give
something in order to be safe, for the fire was too much ignited. Therefore, we gave our money,
and told the man to whom we gave it that we were giving our money for the needy as could be
seen in the newspaper of July 27.
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Unfortunately for Quakers, the Revolutionaries in Philadelphia were
unwilling to treat them so generously. On October 20, 1775, the Committee of
the City and Liberties of Philadelphia-that is, the Committee of Safety-
petitioned the Assembly to issue military regulations enforcing the
Congressional proposal. Although the Committee of Safety accepted the
Congressional suggestion that conscientious objectors be exempt from military
service, it requested that "the Terms of Exemption" mandate the payment of an
adequate equivalent:
[T]hat the Petitioners, being sensible "there are some People, who
from religious Principles cannot bear Arms in any Case," wish not to
do "Violence to their Consciences," but as by the Exertions of the
Associators, the Liberty, Property and Lives of those People will be
equally defended with their own, (without any Danger to the Lives,
Liberty or Property of the said People) the Petitioners further pray,
that the Terms of Exemption may be adequate to the Dangers, Loss
of Time and Expense incurred to those who shall associate under the
proposed Regulations. 15
Quakers and other conscientious objectors would have to pay an open
equivalent rather than enjoy the comfort of a euphemism. The next day, the
Committee of the Privates of the Association of the City of Philadelphia and its
Districts made an even broader demand. Resisting the privileges claimed by
those with religious objections to fighting, the Privates argued that if there
were to be any exemption from military service, it should be generally
available:
That the Petitioners do . . pray the Honourable House . . . to
recommend to their Constituents some general Plan of a Militia Law,
which shall equally extend to all the good People of this Province,
and that any Indulgence which may be thought necessary to be
granted by the House to any Freemen of the Province may be equally
open to all, and granted on such Terms as the House may think
And as Congress had given Brother John Henrich and his traveling companion a statement
... that the Committee was to use it accordingly, we therefore did as we were order and had nor
further scruples as to how the Committee used it. For we gave it in good faith for the needy and
the man to whom we gave it gave us a receipt stating that the money would be used for that
purpose.
id. (quoting DONALD F. DURNBAUGH, THE BRETHREN IN COLONIAL AMERICA 361-62 (1967)). As this
quotation suggests, even when conscientious objectors avoided violence to their consciences, they could not
entirely escape intimations of physical violence.
15 Petition from the Committee of the City and Liberties of Philadelphia (Oct. 20, 1775), in PA. HOUSE
JOURNAL, supra note 10, at 627.
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adequate to the many difficult and dangerous Services of those who
are willing to hazard their Lives and Fortunes in Defense of their
Country;-that this, the Petitioners are persuaded would give such
general Satisfaction to those who have already associated, that they
would chearfully exert their utmost Abilities in the Service of their
Country. 16
Long accustomed to seeking exemptions from British monarchs, the Quakers
now had to deal with privates who wanted "any Indulgence" to be "equally
open to all."
II. THE QUAKER PETITION
Fearing that the Assembly would respond to popular demands for payment
of an equivalent, the Quakers at the end of October 1775 presented their own
petition, in which they relied upon Pennsylvania's constitutional guarantees of
liberty of conscience. 17  "It is well known," the Quakers reminded the
Assembly, "that... we, as a religious Society, have declared to the World that
we could not for Conscience Sake bear Arms, nor be concerned in warlike
Preparations, either by personal Service or by paying any Fines, Penalties or
Assessments, imposed in Consideration of our Exemption from such
Services."' 8  On this basis, the Quakers interpreted two of Pennsylvania's
founding documents to provide a constitutional right of exemption that would
have relieved Quakers from any military obligation, whether personal or
financial.
The Quakers drew their constitutional arguments partly from William
Penn's "Laws Agreed to in England." In the late seventeenth century, English
law required Quakers and other religious dissenters to contribute money for the
16 Petition from the Committee of the Privates of the Association of the City of Philadelphia, and Its
Districts (Oct. 21, 1775), in PA. HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note 10, at 627.
17 A COMMITTEE OF TEN FRIENDS, FROM THE MEETING FOR SUFFERINGS.... THE ADDRESS OF THE
PEOPLE CALLED QUAKERS 1 (Oct. 27, 1775) [hereinafter THE ADDRESS OF THE PEOPLE CALLED QUAKERS].
The Address was reprinted in various Philadelphia newspapers.
The Quaker position discussed in the text here is that taken by the Society of Friends in its official
documents. Of course, individual Quakers adopted many other positions about what conscience required. 2
ISAAC SHARPLESS, A HISTORY OF QUAKER GOVERNMENT IN PENNSYLVANIA: THE QUAKERS IN THE
REVOLUTION 128-31, 200 (Philadelphia, T. S. Leach & Co. 1899). For rather different contemporary
perspectives on the divisions among Quakers, see, for example, ISAAC GREY, A SERIOUS ADDRESS TO SUCH OF
THE PEOPLE CALLED QUAKERS, . . .AS PROFESS SCRUPLES RELATIVE TO THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT 23 (2d
ed. Philadelphia, Styner and Cist 1778); RULES OF DISCIPLINE AND CHRISTIAN ADVICES OF THE YEARLY
MEETING OF FRIENDS FOR PENNSYLVANIA AND NEW JERSEY 132-35 (Philadelphia, Samuel Sansom, Jr. 1797).
18 THE ADDRESS OF THE PEOPLE CALLED QUAKERS, supra note 17.
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support of the Church of England and prohibited them from meeting unless
they complied with onerous conditions. In contrast, William Penn in 1682 in
his "Laws Agreed upon in England" assured settlers in his new colony:
That all Persons living in the Province who confess and acknowledge
the one almighty and eternal God to be the Creator, Upholder and
Ruler of the World, and that hold themselves obliged in Conscience
to live peaceably and justly in civil Society, shall in no wise be
molested or prejudiced for their religious Persuasion, or Practice in
Matters of Faith and Worship ....19
In 1775, the Quakers recited this seventeenth-century antidiscrimination clause
and observed that it "hath ever been understood to be the fundamental Part of
the Constitution of this Province from its first Settlement.' 20 Applying its
language to their current predicament, they explained that even if written in
terms of "Matters of Faith and Worship," this guarantee "was not limited to the
Acts of public Worship only, in the manner many, for Want of full
Consideration, would now interpret it."
21
In support of their interpretation, the Quakers then quoted the religion
clause of a second constitutional document, the 1701 Charter of Pennsylvania.
In 1681, King Charles II gave William Penn a charter for Pennsylvania, and
Penn in turn, as proprietor, issued charters for its governance, the final one
being that of 1701. The preface of Penn's charter observed that "no People can
be truly happy ... if abridged of the Freedom of their Consciences, as to their
religious Profession and Worship. 22 More concretely, the Charter offered a
conditional religious liberty. Most religious liberty clauses in colonial charters
merely provided tolerance or a freedom from penalty, subject to the condition
that a person's religion was not a threat to civil society and its peace. The
1701 Pennsylvania religious liberty clause, however, gave not only this
freedom from penalty but also a freedom from coerced support for an
establishment. Moreover, the closing phrase sounded like a freedom from
being required to do anything contrary to conscience.
[N]o Person or Persons ... who shall confess and acknowledge one
almighty GOD, the Creator, Upholder and Ruler of the World, and
profess him or themselves obliged to live peaceably under the civil
19 Id. It continued, "nor shall be compelled at any Time to frequent or maintain any religious Worship,
place or Ministry whatsoever." Id.
20 id.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 1-2.
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Government, shall be in any Case molested or prejudiced in his or
their Person or Estate, because of his or their conscientious
Persuasion or Practice, nor be compelled to frequent or maintain any
religious Worship, Place or Ministry, contrary to his or their Mind,
nor to do or suffer any other Act or Thing contrary to their religious
Persuasion.
2 3
Not paying attention to the initial condition, the Quakers concluded that the
final phrase gave them what they wanted:
We ... earnestly entreat you carefully to guard against any Proposal
or Attempt to deprive us and others of the full Enjoyment of Liberty
of Conscience, and that the solemn Assurance given us in the
Charter, that we shall not be obliged "to do or suffer any Act or
Thing contrary to our religious Persuasion," may not be infringed.24
In their internal religious language, the Quakers understood themselves to
enjoy a liberty of conscience against objectionable civil laws, and they
assumed they had received an assurance of this liberty in the 1701 Charter.25
23 Id. at 2. The 1701 Charter and other early documents are quoted from the 1775 petitions for the sake
of the italics.
24 Id. They also argued that "[t]he Power of judging respecting our Sincerity belongeth only to the Lord
of our Consciences." id.
25 Incidentally, the Quakers of 1775 were more persistent in asserting this liberty of conscience as a
general claim than was William Penn himself. When Penn in 1705 negotiated the surrender of his proprietary
interest to the Crown, he sought to ensure that the inhabitants of Pennsylvania "may have their entire Liberty
of Conscience." Letter from William Penn to Board of Trade (Jan. 2, 1705), in 4 THE PAPERS OF WILLIAM
PENN, 1701-1718, at 319 (Richard S. Dunn & Mary Maples Dunn eds., 1987). Yet when asked if he was
referring to anything more than what was allowed by the Toleration Act, he answered in particular rather than
general terms: "I mean, not only that relating to worship, but education, or Schools, a Coercive Ministeriall
maintainance [and] the Militia." Letter from William Penn to Board of Trade (Jan. 11, 1705), in supra at 321.
A draft of a Schwenkfelder petition to the Committee for Berks County presented arguments similar to
those of the Quakers:
That we, the said inhabitants . . . petition and remonstrate against some late resolves and
doings of the last Convention of the Committee of Berks County whereby every male person
between the age of sixteen and fifty-five years is, without exception and without Regard of
Conscientious Scruples, obliged to take up arms ...or be fined in such a Degree, whereby
numbers of Families would be reduced to utter Ruin ....
If any privilege may be properly called an established privilege, the privilege of conscience
is one of the foremost in the dictates of humanity and of sound reason and is indeed the foremost
amongst them all, that are established and mentioned in our Province Charter, unalterable by any
people or body of people whatsoever, except that six parts out of seven of the freemen of this
province in general assembly met, do consent or make an alteration .... [lit is declared, "That
no person or persons shall be in any case molested or prejudiced ...because of his or their
conscientious persuasion or practice, nor be compelled ... to do or suffer any act or thing
contrary to their religious persuasion."
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III. THE PETITIONS OF THE REVOLUTIONARIES
The Revolutionaries in Philadelphia responded swiftly. In three petitions to
the Assembly at the close of October, they challenged the Quaker
understanding of religious freedom and, in particular, repudiated the Quaker
interpretation of Pennsylvania's constitutional guarantees.
The first of the petitions came from the Philadelphia Committee of Safety.
Two days after the Quakers presented their protest, the Committee of Safety
unanimously voted that "the said Memorial should be counteracted." The next
day, after a committee had prepared a draft, all sixty-six members of the
Committee then present marched "two by two" in a procession to the
Assembly, where they presented their petition.
The Committee of Safety argued that the Quakers were misinterpreting
Pennsylvania's constitutional documents and, moreover, were taking a position
that was unjust and unequal. The Committee "den[ied], that the Clause in the
In good conformity to this established charter right the wisdom of our worthy House of
Assembly have lately made the following Ordinance:
"In Assembly June 30, 1775. The House ... do hereby earnestly recommend to the
Association ... and others that they bear a tender and brotherly regard towards this class of their
fellow-subjects and countrymen .... "
Of the same Genteel Moderation is the sense and resolution of the Continental Congress of
the 18th of July, 1775 .... by which the said, our past statute privilege is guaranteed, further
confirmed and safely preserved ....
S. . [I]n Politicks our common duty to be watchful to preserve entire our charter and
constitution, ye remonstrants cannot sufficiently express their astonishment on finding such
resolves of the said convention which are in direct opposition and violation to all the above cited
Charter rights and to the Recommendations both of our House of Assembly and the Continental
Congress ....
... [W]e are unwilling and cannot submit Rights of civil and religious Privileges, tearing our
Charters, taking our Property from us without our consent ....
Therefore, your Remonstrants do humbly pray and request to reconsider the aforesaid Votes,
Resolves and Doings ....
[Christopher Schultz], A Remonstrance, in Bender, supra note 10, at 40-42. According to Bender, the draft is
in Schultz's handwriting and was probably written in order to be presented and signed at a meeting of a small
number of pacifist inhabitants of Berks County in 1775. Id. Whether it was presented is not clear. Id.
26 For details of the preparation of the petition, its adoption and presentation, see ExTRACTS FROM THE
DIARY OF CHRISTOPHER MARSHALL 49-50 (William Duane ed., Albany, Joel Munsell 1877). The drafting
committee consisted of McKean, Clymer, Smith, Jones, Delany, Wilcox, and Matlack. Id.
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Proprietary Charter, which they cite, is by them truly construed," and it
"humbly conceive[d] this will be evident not only by a due Attention to the
Words themselves, and a Consideration of the Royal Charter granted to the
said William Penn, but also from the Act of Assembly, entitled, 'The Law
concerning Liberty of Conscience.' ' 27 In addition, the Committee rejected the
Quakers' position as unjust, accusing the Quakers of, among other things,
misrepresenting their pacifism and holding opinions "unfriendly to the
Liberties of America."28  Of particular interest for later constitutional
developments in Pennsylvania, the Committee argued from the law of nature
and the principle that all members of society should be equally subject to the
burdens of defense:
[Y]our Petitioners beg Leave to deliver as their humble Opinion, that
Self-preservation is the first Principle of Nature, and a Duty that
every Man indispensably owes not only to himself, but to the
supreme Director and Governor of the Universe, who gave him a
Being; and that in a State of political Society and Government all
Men, by their original Compact and Agreement, are obliged to unite
in defending themselves and those of the same Community against
such as shall attempt unlawfully to deprive them of their just Rights
and Liberties;-that those who withdraw themselves from this
Compact, cannot be entitled to the Protection of the Society;-that
the Safety of the People is the supreme Law;-that he who receives
an equal Benefit, ought to bear an equal Burthen. 29
The petition echoed this concern about equality in its conclusion:
[Y]our Petitioners rest assured ... that you will do equal Justice to
all your Constituents, and therefore they again repeat their Request,
that you will not, at a Time when the united Strength of North-
America, and the Aid of every Individual, is wanted to preserve our
common Rights, exempt many of the Wealthiest among us from co-
operating with their Countrymen in some Way or other, for their
common Safety.
30
27 The Petition and Remonstrance of the Committee of the City and Liberties of Philadelphia (Oct. 31,
1775), in PA. HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note 10, at 638.
28 id.
29 Id. at 638-39.
30 id.
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The Quaker's position would allow them to reap "all the Advantages" of the
American struggle for liberty "without contributing a single Penny, and with
safety to their Persons."
3 1
A second response to the Quakers came from the Officers of the Military
Association of the City and Liberties of Philadelphia, who made similar
arguments in even sharper language. According to the Officers, the Charter
language quoted by the Quakers did not provide a general exemption: "We
cannot alter the Opinion we have ever held with Regard to those Parts of the
Charter quoted by Addressers, that they relate only to an Exemption from any
Acts of Uniformity in Worship and from paying towards the Support of other
religious Establishments." 32 In England, dissenters were subject to penalties
on account of their dissenting beliefs, and they were obliged to provide
financial support for the Church of England. The Charter gave guarantees
against such inequalities, and now, rather than act on the basis of religion, the
officers, in accord with the Charter, simply wanted citizens to be treated
equally:
We know of no Distinctions of Sects when we meet our Fellow
Citizens on Matters of public Concern, and ask those conscientiously
scrupulous against bearing Arms, to contribute towards the Expense
of our Opposition, not because of their "religious Persuasion, but
because the general Defence of the Province demands it; therefore
that Part of the Charter which relates to People not being" molested
or prejudiced in their Person or Estate, on Account "of their
conscientious Persuasion or Practice" is totally out of the Question,
and has been held up with a View to alarm the House with
groundless Apprehensions.
33
31 id.
32 The Memorial of the Officers of the Military Association of the City and Liberties of Philadelphia
(Oct. 31, 1775), in id. at 640.
33 Id. The Officers continued:
We beg to leave to remind the Honorable House of the constant Usage of the Province, and that
in all the Wars we have been engaged in, no Exemption from Fines and Taxation has been made
in Favor of any Set of People; but on the contrary Laws and Ordinances have repeatedly been
made, for the Purposes of Defence, laying general Imposts on the Inhabitants of the Province of
all Sects and Societies.-We are however of Opinion that speculative Disputes should not now
be gone into.
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Conscientious persuasion or practice was not threatened by persons who made
"no Distinctions of Sects when ... meet[ing] ... Fellow Citizens on Matters of
public Concern."
The officers not only disputed the Quakers' misinterpretation of the Charter
but also emphasized the justice of their own position by pointing to the
implications of natural law for equal burdens.
The Enemy are desolating our Country and Danger daily awaits us.
Our Situation therefore furnishes us with Arguments drawn from the
Laws of Nature and Reason which transcend all local
Establishments. From these Laws and the general Principles of civil
Society it is undoubtedly certain, that all Persons who enjoy the
Benefits should also bear their Proportion of the Burthens of the
State.34
Beyond this conventional analysis of benefits and burdens, the Officers
ingeniously turned the rhetoric of "conscience" against the Quakers. The
Officers argued "that those who apply Taxes, and not those whom the
Exigencies of the State and the Weight of a Majority oblige to pay them, are
answerable for the Consequences of such Application." 35 In other words,
legislators rather than taxpayers were morally accountable for the spending of
revenue. Further, an exemption of Quakers from paying for defense would
violate the liberty of conscience of the Officers:
We conscientiously believe that no Member of Society should be
exempted from paying a reasonable Proportion of his Property
towards the general Defense, though he may be exempted from
actually bearing Arms; (and in such Case by paying a Fine for such
Exemption, he is in a better Situation than one who risks his Life in
the Service) and if the wealthy Members of the Society of Quakers
are permitted to withhold their Proportion, it will in some Degree be
an Invasion of our Liberty of Conscience by denying us the Means of
so effectually making a warlike Opposition against our Oppressors,
which cannot be done without Money.
36
Everyone's conscience was to some extent at risk. When concluding their
argument for "an equal and general Contribution . . . from all Ranks of
People," the Officers added: "[W]e fear the People will no longer submit to see
34 id.
35 id.
36 id.
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the public Burthen so unequally borne." 37 These were the egalitarian political
realities.
In a third petition, the Committee of the Privates of Philadelphia argued
that a general constitutional grant of conscientious exemption could not be
binding. Faced with a charter that could be interpreted to support the Quaker
position, the Privates declared that a constitution's grant of a right of
exemption should be disregarded as inconsistent with the natural law of self-
preservation: "[T]he great Law of Self-preservation is equally binding with the
Letter of written Charters, nor can it be supposed that a People will be
reasoned out of their Liberty and every Thing they hold dear by an over-nice
scanning of them., 38 Moreover, Penn could not have given more than the King
had granted him:
William Penn, had no Right, Power or Authority to grant Privileges
further than was granted to him by the Royal Charter, and that the
Royal Prerogative of the King of Great-Britain does not comprehend
any Right or Authority in the Crown to grant any Exemption from
supporting the Constitution and Government to any Man or Set of
men on any Pretence whatever. This is a Power unknown to the
Crown, and therefore could never be granted by the King to the
Worthy Proprietor who granted the Charter of Privileges.
39
Penn did not have greater authority than the Crown.
The Privates bolstered these arguments-based on natural law and the
limited power of the Crown-by observing more generally that liberty of
conscience should not be understood to undermine civil government:
Liberty of Conscience is so sacred a Thing that it ought ever to be
preserved inviolate, and we will always rejoice to see any Body of
Men assert their Right to it. But when, under Pretence of this Liberty
the very Existence of Civil Government is struck at, we beg leave to
represent that either the Liberty claimed must be given up or the
Government dissolved; and this we apprehend to be the Case when
any of the Members of a Community, from a claim of Religious
Liberty, refuse to support the Society to which they belong, and
under which they claim this very Privilege.
0
37 id.
38 Petition of the Committee of Privates of the Association Belonging to the City of Philadelphia and Its
Districts (Oct. 31, 1775), in PA. HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note 10, at 641.
39 id.
40 id.
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When men refused to support their society on grounds of religious liberty, they
put their government at risk.
The Privates, indeed, presented the most careful legal argument of the
debate. They began their analysis of Pennsylvania's constitutional documents
by noting that "as to the Thirty-fifth Section of Laws agreed upon in
England'-which concerned molestation or prejudice on account of religious
persuasion or practice-the Privates "would pass it over as a Section which we
apprehend none but your Addressors [the Quakers] would apply to the present
Purpose.",41 The guarantee that came closest to the Quakers' purpose was that
of Penn's 1701 Charter to the effect that no person "be compelled ... to do or
suffer any other Act or Thing, contrary to their religious Persuasion.' 42 Yet
this guarantee was subject to a condition of living quietly:
That the Clause, which they quote, never did, nor could, extend to
such Exemptions on any Pretence whatever, is plain from itself,
because the Persons, who have a Right to claim the Liberty granted
therein, are by that very Clause made to "profess themselves obliged
to live quietly under the civil Government," which cannot possibly be
when they refuse to support the Measures often necessary to its very
existence.
43
Although the Charter had stated that no person should be obliged to do
anything contrary to his conscience, it had made this and its other promises of
religious freedom only to persons who lived peaceably-in the language of the
Privates, "quietly"-under civil government. From the intensely pious
perspective of many Quakers, this condition of living peaceably or quietly
under civil government was hardly an obstacle to their claims, for who if not
the Quakers, were devoted to peaceable and quiet living? an The ideal of quiet
or peaceable living, however, was open to different interpretations, and at law,
peaceable conduct was that which did not amount to a criminal offense. In
particular, a breach of the peace was the basic measure of the criminal
41 Id.
42 THE ADDRESS OF THE PEOPLE CALLED QUAKERS, supra note 17.
43 Petition of the Committee of Privates (Oct. 31, 1775), in PA. HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note 10, at 641.
44 Quaker writings are replete with discussions of a peaceable or quiet life and of patience, and in this
context the words "patient," "peaceable," and "quiet" were almost synonymous. See, e.g., WILLIAM
ROBERTSON, PHRASEOLOGIA GENERALIS 979-80, 982, 1041-43 (Cambridge, John Hayes 1681). Of course,
the Christian notions of patience, peaceability, and quietness were hardly a monopoly of the Quakers and were
largely derived from more ancient traditions reaching back to, among others, the Stoics. For an illustration of
such ideas among other Christians, note an Anglican variant by an early seventeenth-century Bishop of
Limerick. GEORGE WEBBE, THE PRACrISE OF QUIETNESS DIRECTING A CHRISTIAN How To LIVE QUIETLY IN
THIS TROUBLESOME WORLD (London, George Edwards 1617).
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jurisdiction of the royal courts and thus was also the conventional definition of
a misdemeanor. 45  Against this background, the Privates thought that the
condition of living quietly under civil government was hardly met by persons
who refused to serve or pay an equivalent during their government's greatest
exigency.
The Privates' interpretation, that the clause in Penn's 1701 Charter did not
exempt the Quakers, was supported, the Privates claimed, by the provision in
the royal Charter that gave William Penn and his successors the power to
"levy, muster and train all Sorts of Men" for the making of war. This
provision secured by Penn from the Crown showed "evidently that the
Proprietor William Penn never intended to grant an Exemption from paying
their just Proportion." And, "[b]esides it is well known, that no such Claim of
Exemption from contributing their just Proportion towards the Support of any
Civil or Military Measure ... has even been granted the Society, on account of
any such Scruple of Conscience, in any Part of the British Empire.
4 6
IV. THE REJECTION OF THE QUAKER POSITION
The Pennsylvania Assembly and then the drafters of Pennsylvania's
constitution gave legal force to the rejection of the Quakers' position.
According to its Journal, the Assembly did not immediately address the
problem of exemption once it received the anti-Quaker petitions. The
Assembly was less radical than the Revolutionaries who controlled the City of
Philadelphia, and it may have delayed in order to avoid harsh measures against
the Quakers.47 After a week, however, it required conscientious objectors to
pay an equivalent-even if under another name.
On November 7, Mennonites and German Baptists petitioned for a liberty
of conscience that would prove more attractive to the Revolutionaries than the
Quakers. Unlike the Quakers, the Mennonites and German Baptists did not
make so great a concession to worldly power as to rely upon the provisions of
Pennsylvania's Charter. Nor, indeed, did they spell out their view on paying
an equivalent. Instead, they stated in very simple language that "we are willing
to pay Taxes," but "we are not at Liberty in Conscience to take up Arms to
45 More generally, see Hamburger, A Constitutional Right, supra note 3, at 918.
46 Petition of the Committee of Privates (Oct. 31, 1775), in PA. HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note 10, at 642.
47 Wilbur Bender has argued that the Assembly "yielded from necessity" to the radical demands of the
Committee of Safety, leading to a compromise not satisfactory to either side. Bender, supra note 10, at 25.
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conquer our Enemies." Even when the petition elaborated that "[w]e find no
Freedom in giving, or doing, or assisting in any Thing by which Men's Lives
are destroyed or hurt," it was so vague as to leave open the possibility that the
Assembly could impose an equivalent in the form of a tax, provided that the
proceeds were not earmarked for war.48 Of course, some Mennonites opposed
such a tax, but the Mennonites in their petition did not clearly go so far. The
Mennonites apparently were divided, and their reluctance to take an
unequivocal stand against an equivalent would long be remembered by the
Quakers. In 1791, when Congress was considering the Militia Bill and the
Quakers were lobbying for an exemption from both fighting and paying, James
Pemberton urged his co-religionists to pursue their lobbying effort with
particular vigor because they stood alone: It was "was the more necessary, as
some other Societies who profess a testimony against War, do not object to the
payment of such a fine or mulct, as the Moravians[,] Menonists, Swingfielders,
& some other Inhabitants of this State. 49
The day after the Mennonites presented their petition, the Assembly, sitting
in a committee of the whole, resolved in favor of a financial equivalent from
conscientious objectors:
3. That it is the Opinion of this Committee, that it be recommended
to all Male white Persons within this Province, between the Ages of
Sixteen and Fifty Years, who have not already associated, and are not
conscientiously scrupulous of bearing Arms, to join the said
Association immediately ....
5. That it is the Opinion of this Committee, that all Male white
Persons between the ages aforesaid, capable of bearing Arms, who
shall not associate for the Defence of this Province, ought to
contribute an Equivalent to the Time spent by the Associators in
48 An Address or Declaration Signed by Divers Persons in Behalf of the Societies of Mennonists and
German Baptists in this Province (Nov. 7, 1775), in PA. HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note 10, at 645. In 1776,
Mennonites and Dunkards presented a similar address to the Maryland Constitutional Convention. C. HENRY
SMrrIH, THE MENNONITES OF AMERICA 370-72 (1909); Bender, supra note 10, at 24-25.
49 Letter from James Pemberton to Moses Brown & Thomas Arnold (Jan. 19, 1791) (Rhode Island
Historical Society, Moses Brown Papers-Series I, Mss 313). Mennonites for their part had reason to fear that
their position would be confused with that of the Quakers. In Lancaster, the County Committee of Inspection
and Observation issued a broadside regretting "that divers persons whose religious tenets forbid their forming
themselves into military associations have been maltreated by some violent and ill disposed people in the
county of Lancaster, notwithstanding their willingness to contribute cheerfully to the common cause otherwise
than by bearing arms .... Bender, supra note 10, at 23.
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acquiring the Military Discipline, Ministers of the Gospel of all
Denominations, and Servants purchased bona fide, and for valuable
Consideration, only excepted.
The "conscientiously scrupulous" would not have to serve but would have to
pay an "Equivalent." Later in the month, the Assembly adopted military
regulations that gave its resolutions the force of law-although probably in
deference to Mennonites and some of the other German sects, the Assembly
now explained that it was "Levying Taxes on Non-Associators."
5 1
The legal rejection of the Quakers' conception of conscience did not end in
November 1775. Many Revolutionaries resented a minority that had not
shared power until it had little choice and that now apparently was content to
reap the benefits of sacrifices made by others. To make matters worse, during
the tense winter of 1776, following their defeat, some of the Quakers published
rather strong expressions of sympathy for the Crown, and they thereby seemed
to confirm the Revolutionaries' worst suspicions. They published a tract, The
Ancient Testimony and Principles of the People Called Quakers, in which they
recited the benefits of "our dependence on, and connection with, the kings and
government" of Britain and urged Quakers "to guard against every attempt to
alter, or subvert that dependence and connection.' 52  They also directly
attacked the Revolutionaries:
May we . . . unite in the abhorrence of all such writings, and
measures as evidence a desire and design to break off the happy
50 Resolutions (Nov. 8, 1775), in PA. HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note 10, at 646.
51 Resolutions Directing the Mode of Levying Taxes on Non-Associators in Pennsylvania (Nov. 25,
1775), in PA. HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note 10, at 660. Tellingly, when the Assembly adopted regulations for
the Military Association, it required: "All National Distinctions in Dress or Name to be avoided, it being
proper that we should now be united in this General Association for defending our Liberties and Properties,
under the sole Denomination of Americans." Rules and Regulations for the Better Government of the Military
Association in Pennsylvania (Nov. 25, 1775), in PA. HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note 10, at 656.
Of course, some associators complained that the taxes were not high enough, and others wanted "all
Persons alledging Scruples of Conscience" to take "a Test by Oath or Affirmation" to prove they were not
"Pretenders." Petition of ... Field-Officers in the Several Battalions in Berks County, in Behalf of Said
Battalions (Feb. 23, 1776), in PA. HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note 10, at 699; The Petition of the Privates of the
Military Association of the City and Liberties of Philadelphia (Feb. 23, 1776), in PA. HOUSE JOURNAL, supra
note 10, at 673. The Assembly eventually raised the tax on non-Associators, but not to the extent that could
have satisfied all Revolutionaries. Resolutions Directing the Mode of Levying Taxes on Non-Associators
(April 5, 1776), in PA. HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note 10, at 713.
52 THE ANCIENT TESTIMONY AND PRINCIPLES OF THE PEOPLE CALLED QUAKERS, RENEWED, WITH
RESPECT TO THE KING AND GOVERNMENT; AND TOUCHING THE COMMOTIONS Now PREVAILING 3 (1776). The
pamphlet was "Signed in and on behalf of a meeting of the Representatives of our Religious Society, in
Pennsylvania and New-Jersey; held at Philadelphia, the 20th day of the first month, 1776. John Pemberton,
Clerk." Id. at 4.
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connection we have heretofore enjoyed, with the kingdom of Great
Britain, and our just and necessary subordination to the king, and
those who are lawfully placed in authority under him .... 53
In response, Thomas Paine in February 1776 added a scathing address to the
Quakers at the end of his Common Sense. After arguing that the Quakers
should not mix religion with politics, Paine summarized his objections to the
Quaker publication:
[I]t hath a tendency to undo that continental harmony and friendship
which yourselves by your late liberal charitable donations hath lent a
hand to establish; and the preservation of which, is of the utmost
consequence to us all.
And here without anger or resentment I bid you farewell.
Sincerely wishing, that as men and christians, ye may always fully
and uninterruptedly enjoy every civil and religious right; and be, in
your turn, the means of securing it to others; but that the example
which ye have unwisely set, of mingling religion with politics, may
be disavowed and reprobated by every inhabitant of AMERICA.
Revolutionaries frequently mixed religion and politics, but they abhorred
religious support for British oppression and religious protests against the duty
that secured every civil and religious right.
During the following summer, the Revolutionaries wrote the new
Constitution of Pennsylvania, and they used it to remove any possible doubt as
to the rights of Quakers. Article II of the Declaration of Rights stated:
That all men have a natural and unalienable right to worship
Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences and
understanding: And that no man ought or of right can be compelled
to attend any religious worship, or erect or support any place of
worship, or maintain any ministry, contrary to, or against, his own
free will and consent: Nor can any man, who acknowledges the being
of a God, be justly deprived or abridged of any civil right as a citizen,
on account of his religious sentiments or peculiar mode of religious
worship: And that no authority can or ought to be vested in, or
assumed by any power whatever, that shall in any case interfere with,
or in any manner controul, the right of conscience in the free exercise
of religious worship. 55
53 id.
54 THOMAS PAINE, To the Representatives of the... Quakers, in COMMON SENSE app. H (Feb. 14, 1776).
For more on the Ancient Testimony and Paine's response, see MEKEEL, supra note 3, at 158-60.
55 PA. CONST. of 1776, Decl. of Rights, art. II.
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This new language largely followed the colonial Charter, but it also clarified
the freedom guaranteed-a pair of changes being particularly significant. On
the one hand, the Constitution dropped the Charter's words that had
conditioned religious freedom on a profession of peaceableness. On the other
hand, whereas the Charter had loosely promised that no one "be compelled...
to do or suffer any other Act or Thing contrary to their religious Persuasion,"
the Constitution now limited this to worship: It declared "a natural and
unalienable right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their
own consciences and understanding," and it protected "the right of conscience
in the free exercise of religious worship." Like other liberal guarantees of
religious liberty, this provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution avoided
expansive language that might allow religion to threaten civil government, and
by tightening the definition of the right, it could remove the offensive
condition on access to it.
56
Even while denying the Quakers' claim of a general constitutional right of
exemption, the drafters of Pennsylvania's new constitution, like the Officers
and the Committee of Safety, were neither so lacking in sympathy nor so
impolitic as to threaten Quakers with military service. Yet in conformity with
both their political principles and their government's financial needs, the
drafters insisted on an equivalent. In Article VIII of the Declaration of Rights,
the drafters constitutionalized this combination of an exemption from service
and an equivalent payment:
That every member of society hath a right to be protected in the
enjoyment of life, liberty and property, and therefore is bound to
contribute his proportion towards the expence of that protection, and
yield his personal service when necessary, or an equivalent thereto:
But no part of a man's property can be justly taken ... without his
own consent, or that of his legal representatives: Nor can any man
who is conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms, be justly
compelled thereto, if he will pay such equivalent ....
56 For other constitutions that similarly combined tightened definitions and unconditional access, see
Hamburger, A Constitutional Right, supra note 7, at 923-24; Hamburger, More Is Less, supra note 7, at 848-
57.
57 PA. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. VIII. Later, in attempting to persuade Quakers to give
up their view of conscience, Isaac Grey echoed some of the sentiments apparent in the 1775 petitions against
exemptions and in the 1776 Pennsylvania Constitution: "[I]f we receive advantage from civil government, we
ought to bear our part of the charge of maintaining it, or else have no recourse to it in any case whatever."
GREY, supra note 17, at 22.
It is difficult to evaluate the total amount of equivalents paid by Quakers in Pennsylvania or the total
amount of fines paid by them for their various failures to conform to law. In 1790, Elias Boudinot stated:
2005]
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
With language reminiscent of the anti-Quaker petitions, this clause of the
Constitution adopted the tolerant, but not entirely accommodating position of
the Officers and the Committee of Safety.
The Constitution, however, did not stop with demanding payment of an
equivalent, for it also included voter qualifications that tended to exclude
Quakers. Men who failed to pay their taxes could not vote.58 Those who
refused to swear or affirm allegiance to the Constitution could not sit in the
House of Representatives. 59 In general, these were not unusual or distinctly
harsh measures, but against many Quakers, they amounted to
disenfranchisement.
V. QUAKERS' RECOGNITION OF DEFEAT
Quakers recognized their defeat and turned from constitutional argument to
religious resistance. Late in 1776, the annual Epistle of the Philadelphia
Meeting on Sufferings urged Quakers:
Thus we may with Christian firmness and fortitude withstand and
refuse to submit to the arbitrary injunctions and ordinances of men,
who assume to themselves the power of compelling others, either in
person or by other assistance, to join in carrying on war, and of
prescribing modes of determining concerning our religious
principles, by imposing tests not warranted by the precepts of Christ,
or the laws of the happy constitution, under which we and others
long enjoyed tranquility and peace.6 1
I have taken some trouble in examining into their situation here during the late war; and find,
that, from March 1777, till April 1783, they paid, in the city of Philadelphia alone, fines to the
amount of £.864,262, Pennsylvania currency, in continental money, £.1,551 state money, and
£.682 in specie. In the county of Bucks, they paid £.443,404, continental money; £.612 state
money, and £.2,497 hard money.
H.R. (DEC. 23, 1790), as reported in DUNLAP'S AMERICAN DAILY ADVERTISER (Jan. 4, 1791), in 14
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 169 (1995).
58 PA. CONST. of 1776, § 6.
'9 Id. § 10.
60 SHARPLESS, supra note 17, at 142-43.
61 AN EPISTLE FROM THE MEETING FOR SUFFERINGS, OF THE PEOPLE CALLED QUAKERS, HELD AT
PHILADELPHIA, FOR PENNSYLVANIA AND NEW JERSEY, TO OUR FRIENDS AND BRETHREN IN RELIGIOUS
PROFESSION, IN THESE AND THE ADJACENT PROVINCES (Dec. 20, 1776). For another printing, see To OUR
FRIENDS AND BRETHREN IN RELIGIOUS PROFESSION, IN THESE AND THE ADJACENT PROVINCES (Dec. 20, 1776).
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When this Epistle and others came under criticism for questioning the
Revolutionaries and their Constitution, at least some Quakers offered a secular
defense of Penn's charter:
"The happy Constitution under which we and others long enjoyed
Tranquility and Peace" are Words which we understand have given
offence to some of those who have been engaged in forming a new
one-they have thought it derogatory to their Skill as Legislators that
such a Work which they had rejected should be spoken of with so
much Respect-But we who have known the Happiness enjoy'd in
Pennsylvania under the mild Administration of so wholesome a Form
of Government cannot but express our Regret that it was so little
esteemed as to be wholly set at naught.
62
These Quakers also argued that "as soon as" the Charter "was overturned and a
new Form introduced, a Spirit of Persecution was rais'd, that threatened our
Society, the Descendents of the first Settlers, with the Loss of Religious
Liberty which their Ancestors had purchased at so dear a Rate & transmitted to
them as an unalienable Inheritance." Indeed, the new government "actually
began to hold Cognisance over our Consciences. 63 This was not, however,
the sort of argument likely to persuade men who had just adopted a
constitution that protected equal religious liberty and that even exempted
conscientious objectors from bearing arms if they would pay an equivalent.
The Quakers came to understand the futility of protesting this equality and,
retreating into their faith, they advised their brethren to respond to the
Revolutionaries in a manner consistent with Quaker traditions. For example, at
the close of 1776, the Yearly Meeting urged Christian patience:
[I]f after a long time of enjoying the fruits of their labors and
partaking of the blessings of peace and plenty we should be
restrained or deprived of some of our rights and privileges, let us
carefully guard against being drawn into the vindication of them, and
seeking redress by any measures which are not consistent with our
religious profession and principles nor with the Christian patience
manifested by our ancestors in such times of trial. 6
62 Observations on the Charges Contained in Several Resolves of Congress, Against the Society of
People Called Quakers, in A Bundle of Papers of Addressed to Robert Pleasants, 3 PLEASANTS TRANSCRIPTS
38 (2d pagination series) Valentine Museum, Richmond.
63 Id. at 39.
64 General Advices of Yearly Meeting for 1776, quoted in SHARPLESS, supra note 17, at 141. Similarly,
in a 1778 address relating to education, Quakers discussed the old charter, at least as a measure of what
government ought to do. Id. at 181.
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When constitutional argument failed, a people unwilling to fight had little
choice but patience.
65
In the years that followed, the Quakers of Pennsylvania would need much
patience, for the Revolutionaries were not entirely convinced that the Quakers
were quiescent. The complaints of Quakers that they had been deprived of
their rights, their ambiguous neutrality, and their failure to contribute even
their wealth to the American cause provoked the deepest suspicions. When the
Philadelphia Revolutionaries in 1777 became panicked that Quakers were
cooperating with the enemy, they seized some leading Quakers and their
families and sent them to be imprisoned at a safe distance in Winchester,
Virginia.66  More typically, Quakers were fined for failing to pay taxes or
equivalents, and substantial numbers had their property sold to pay the various
sums they would not willingly turn over to the authorities. These fines and
sales were but some of the tribulations Quakers would suffer for holding to
religious principles not entirely satisfied by the equality under law that was the
model of religious liberty in the new nation.
VI. THE FREE QUAKERS
To this account of the constitutional debate between Quakers and
Revolutionaries in 1775 and 1776, an ironic epilogue must be added.
Although the focus here has been on the dispute between the Quakers and the
Revolutionaries, each group suffered from its own, internal quarrels, and one
65 At least one prominent, if schismatic, Mennonite, Christian Funk, optimistically interpreted the new
Constitution as confirming old rights. Although first inclined to support the English, he had doubts after
reading the new Pennsylvania Constitution: "[l]t caused much reflection in me that we should despise the
government that offered us the like liberty, which Wm. Penn had guaranteed to our fathers in Europe .... Our
ministers and elders, however, still considered Congress as rebels." CHRISTIAN FUNK, A MIRROR FOR ALL
MANKIND 9 (1814), quoted in Bender, supra note 10, at 25. Funk eventually sought a neutral position. Id.
66 For other false accusations against the Quakers, see the explanation of the so-called "Spanktown"
affair in A SHORT VINDICATION OF THE RELIGIOUS SOCIETY CALLED QUAKERS 3-4 (Philadelphia, Joseph
Crukshank 1780). Perhaps the most severe measure contemplated against the Quakers was that proposed by
General Lacey:
While the British were in the city [of Philadelphia], an American order was issued to prevent the
attendance of Friends at the Yearly Meeting, on the plea that these meetings were centres of
plotting against the government .... [E]ven Washington seemed to have entertained some
suspicion. General Lacey, to whom the orders were given, passed them on with the injunction
"to fire into those who refused to stop when hailed, and leave their dead bodies lying in the
road."
SHARPLESS, supra note 17, at 183.
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of these internal divisions, between pacifist Quakers and the so-called "Free
Quakers," curiously echoed the debate between the Quakers and the
Revolutionaries. 67  The Free Quakers supported the Revolution, and they
therefore were disowned by the main body of the Quakers, the Society of
Friends. In response, the Free Quakers complained that they had been
excluded from the Society of Friends in violation of their right of conscience:
"This separation has not been sought by, but forced upon us," by churches that
were "vainly attempting to abridge the rights of conscience," and it appeared
that "they will not permit, among them, that Christian liberty of sentiment and
conduct which all are entitled to enjoy, and which we cannot consent to part
with.",6 8  Notwithstanding that they sought freedom from the rules of a
voluntary religious society rather than from the laws of a civil society, the Free
Quakers felt justified in "appealing to that divine principle breathed by the
breath of God into the hearts of all, to leave every man to think and judge for
himself., 69  What Quakers had argued against the civil government, the Free
Quakers, with less justification, now pressed against their religious society.
The Quakers responded with language not unlike that recently used against
them: "[F]reedom of enquiry is allowed, and liberty of action is allowed, so far
as can be consistent with the nature and peace of society, which cannot be
properly supported, if its members are suffered to live in the breach of its rules
and orders, without any animadversion. In rejecting members of their
67 Quakers disagreed among themselves on many issues, including not only whether they should fight the
British but also whether they should pay bills of credit issued to support the war. SHARPLESS, supra note 17, at
129-30.
68 SOCIETY OF FRIENDS, PHILADELPHIA MEETING, AN ADDRESS TO THOSE OF THE PEOPLE CALLED
QUAKERS, WHO HAVE BEEN DISOWNED FOR MATTERS RELIGIOUS OR CIVIL (Apr. 24, 1781).
69 Id. In addition to this traditional argument about conscience, however, the Free Quakers employed
arguments reminiscent of some of the anti-Quaker petitions of their Revolutionary compatriots: "The Creator
of man," the Free Quakers wrote, "has, in the present great revolution, thus far established among us
governments under which no man, who acknowledges the being of a God, can be abridged of any civil right on
account of his religious sentiments." The Discipline of the Society of Friends, by Some Styled the Free
Quakers (Aug. 8, 1781), in SOCIETY OF FRIENDS, PHILADELPHIA MEETING FOR BUSINESS (1781). They also
wrote:
But governments established upon those liberal, just, and truly christian principles, and wisely
confined to the great objects of ascertaining and defending civil rights, in avoiding the possibility
of wounding the conscience of any, must unavoidably leave some cases unprovided for, which
come properly under the care of religious societies. Hence we are not only left at liberty to act
agreeably to our sentiments; but the necessity and obligation of establishing and supporting
religious societies, are increased and strengthened.
Id.
70 TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF PENNSYLVANIA: AN ADDRESS AND MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE
PEOPLE CALLED QUAKERS (Jan. 18, 1782). Incidentally, this address quoted John Locke:
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Society who participated in the War, the Quakers ended up adopting the
arguments of the larger society. Like a civil society, a religious society needed
its members to adhere to its rules.
CONCLUSION
The Quakers failed to establish their interpretation of William Penn's
Charter or otherwise to protect what they understood to be their general
"liberty of conscience." Indeed, they provoked Pennsylvania's
Revolutionaries to clarify in the 1776 Constitution that the right of conscience
extended only to "the free exercise of religious worship." The Revolutionaries
thus bluntly repudiated the Quakers' expectation of a general constitutional
right of conscience, and this rejection was echoed, ironically, by the Quakers
themselves.
For the history of religious liberty, the dispute in Philadelphia reveals how
the American Revolution and its ideals of equality sharpened the
differentiation between two ideals of religious liberty: on the one hand, an
equal freedom under law, regardless of religion; on the other, a freedom from
law precisely on account of one's religion. Although the men who drafted
constitutions in other states faced similar choices, the Philadelphia controversy
remains the most striking illustration of how the Revolution and its
egalitarianism clarified this conceptual divide.
For constitutional law, the Philadelphia controversy provides some of the
missing historical background to claims of a constitutional right of religious
exemption. In particular, it illuminates the concept of freedom from penalty on
religion and the depth of its social and political context. Disagreements about
a freedom from law became public in Philadelphia, because it was there that
Quakers were sufficiently accustomed to political influence that they imagined
they could prevail. Yet, whereas Quakers in England could plead for
exemptions with the gentry, aristocrats, and even monarchs, in Philadelphia
they had to justify themselves to privates. Their confrontation with
As no man is bound to any church against his particular conscience, neither is any church bound
to any man against that rule and order established therein, according to its collective conscience.
I hold that no church is bound by the duty of toleration, to retain any such person in her bosom
Id. The Quakers then continued: "Liberty of conscience, is every man's undoubted right, and no less the right
of every religious society .. " Id.
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Revolutionaries in Philadelphia was only the most prominent and poignant
instance of how the Quaker ideal of a general freedom from objectionable laws
increasingly collided with the new nation's developing social realities and
political ideals. Americans were religiously diverse, they hoped for equal
freedom, and many resented a minority that simultaneously demanded special
privileges and refused shared duties. In this context, Philadelphians and other
Americans tended to deny that anyone had a general freedom from law on
account of his religion. Instead, they sought variants of another ideal-an
equal freedom under law, regardless of religious differences.
